The judicial theory of associational standing allows an organization to sue on behalf of an injury to one or more of its members.' Although this mode of representation provides for greater and more effective access to the courts because of the greater financial resources and expertise of an organization, 2 associational standing can also create significant difficulties when not all members of the organization support the litigation, thus creating an internal conflict of interest. 3 A frequent example in the case law occurs when a business association attempts to overturn a statute providing contracting advantages to minority-owned businesses. The business association has members who would be hurt by successful litigation (minority-owned businesses) and members who would be helped by successful litigation (non-minority-owned businesses).' Courts split over how to handle an organization that is litigating on behalf of some of its members and to the detriment of others. 6 Specifically, some courts have found that or- 
ganizations with internal conflicts of interest may have associational standing while others have denied standing under similar circumstances.
In Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 7 the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test to determine whether an organization can assert associational standing on behalf of its members:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 8 Although this test appears simple and forthright, the Supreme Court has never fully explained the reasoning underlying any of the prongs nor applied the test to an organization with an internal conflict of interest Consequently, lower courts have divided not only over how to apply the test, but also over which prong should be the focus of the analysis. ' Some lower courts have found that certain types of "profound" conflicts will foreclose standing under the "germaneness prong."" Other courts have determined that the "individual participation prong" is the appropriate analytical tool with which to examine whether an internal conflict of interest will prohibit associational standing.1 2 However, among courts favoring Hunt's individual participation prong, some have found that internal conflicts of interest do not prohibit associational standing,' 3 while others have found that certain internal conflicts would prohibit standing if the litigation was not properly authorized by the members of the organization."
This Comment attempts to provide guidance in understanding the myriad approaches to associational standing currently followed by federal appellate courts. A simple two-part test can easily categorize and fully explain the apparent chaos among the circuits. The proposed solution requires formalizing the underlying reasoning of the lower courts' analyses. The solution would require, as a first step, heightened scrutiny of organizations with certain types of "profound" conflicts. Then, in an examination under the germaneness prong, a court should reject standing whenever a profound conflict negates the adversity required by the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III of the Constitution. However, a court should grant associational standing if the organization can show that the litigation was adequately authorized by its members because such a showing suffices to demonstrate sufficient adversity. Profound conflicts also may require individual participation, thus violating Hunt's individual participation prong, but courts should seek other mechanisms to preserve dissenting members' rights.
Part I discusses the constitutional origins of the associational standing doctrine. Part II analyzes the various problems and inconsistencies of the approaches and discuss their theoretical underpinnings. Finally, Part III recommends an easy-to-administer solution that formalizes the current lower courts' analyses, emphasizes how to minimize constitutional concerns, and maximizes judicial efficiency.
I. THE ORIGINS OFTHE ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING DOCTRINE
This Part explores the foundations of the associational standing doctrine. It examines how the constitutional underpinnings of the standing doctrine limit a federal court's power to hear a case. Then it analyzes the case law origins of the associational standing doctrine, paying particular attention to the principles espoused in each Supreme Court opinion.
A. Article I Limits the Power of the Judiciary to Hear Cases
Article III restricts courts to hearing only cases and controversies.'-However, the general phrasing of Article III allows for various 13 See, for example, id at 1231-34. 14 See, for example, Maryland Highways Contractors, 933 F2d at 1252-53 (holding that the individual participation prong was not met when association filed suit because some members would benefit from the litigation but others would suffer).
15 US ConstArt III, § 2, cl 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-[69:351
interpretations by courts.1 6 The minimal standing requirement of a "case or controversy" has been interpreted to require that parties before the court have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. 7 Traditionally, courts have interpreted the Article III standing doctrine to forbid the assertion of rights of third parties in order to preserve the "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult ... questions." 8 However, with the increasing complexity of litigation, courts have allowed alternate structures through which organizations or representatives may litigate on behalf of others.' 9 An organization may gain standing when it itself suffers a direct injuryno or it may sue as the representative of its injured members. 2 ' However, the "concrete adverseness" of the parties remains a critical issue in the development of associational standing." tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a state, or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects. 16 See Haitian Refugee Center v Gracey, 809 F2d 794,798 (DC Cir 1987) ("It should be said at the outset that the law of standing remains uncertain and unsettled in some of its major branches."). 17 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61 (1992). In Lujan, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test that organizes the constitutional requirements for standing: (1) the party must suffer an "injury in fact" which is concrete and particular and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury must be traceable to the disputed action; and (3) a favorable decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id. See, for example, Hunt, 432 US at 341-43 (granting an advertisers' association standing because it alleged injury to its members). See also Moore, 15 Moore's Federal Practice § 101.60 at 101-100 (cited in note 1) (noting that the organization does not have to assert a "personal stake" because it can gain standing solely as the representative of its members).
22 The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed concern over the zealousness of litigants in associational standing doctrine cases. See, for example, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc, 517 US 544, 557 (1996) ("[T]he entire doctrine of 'representational standing,' of which the notion of 'associational standing' is only one strand, rests on the premise that in certain circumstances, particular relationships (recognized either by common-law tradition or by statute) are sufficient to rebut the background presumption ... that litigants may not assert the rights of absent third parties.") (citations omitted); Brock, 477 US at 297 (Powell dissenting) ("This Court has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to confer standing on third parties for fear of inadequate representation.").
B. The Associational Standing Doctrine Allows Organizations to Assert the Rights of Their Members
The Supreme Court overcame the constitutional concerns regarding third-party standing in a progression of cases in which the Court found that an organization or association was a better party to bring the litigation than were the original injured parties. The requirement of sufficient adversity, which is an important aspect of associational standing highlighted in the case law, will assist in explaining the impact of internal conflicts of interest.
In its early cases, the Supreme Court focused on how organizations could gain standing to protect the rights of their members. NAACP v Patterson2 was one of the first cases in which the Court held that organizations could assert the rights of their members. 24 In Patterson, the Court found that an organization could be the best party to protect the rights of its members because the association and its members "are in every practical sense identical.
' ' 2 In Warth v Seldin,2 the Court acknowledged that organizations could gain associational standing even in the absence of injury to the organizations themselves.2 The Court insisted, however, that in representing their members, organizations must meet the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement for the Court to have the power to hear the case.n The Court held that a plaintiff might assert the rights of a third party if "countervailing considerations" outweigh judicial reluctance to allow one party to assert the claims of another.2 The Court also examined how the prospective relief would benefit the members of the organization!" 23 357 US 449 (1958). 24 Id at 458-60. 2 Id at 459. The Court granted representational standing to the NAACP when it sought to assert the privacy rights of its members, calling the association "the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views" Id. 
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Warth, 422 US at 500-01. Specifically, the Court noted that the issue of standing involves both constitutional case-or-controversy limitations on a federal court's jurisdiction and the court's own circumspection in exercising its jurisdiction. Id at 498. Both of these prudential considerations, the Court asserted, are founded on the "concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." Id.
30 Id at 515. The Warth court stated:
[W]hether an association has standing to invoke the court's remedial powers on behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective reliet it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.
The Supreme Court articulated the principle of associational standing in Hunt. In this seminal case, an association of apple growers sought to overturn a North Carolina statute that prohibited Washington State grade symbols on apple containers." The Court found that the association had standing to represent the interests of its applegrowing members and provided a three-prong test for lower courts to apply in identifying organizations that are seeking associational standing.
Although the Supreme Court has never fully developed the contours of any of the prongs, lower courts have considered the prongs' underlying policies. The first, the members' standing prong, ensures that part of the Article III case or controversy requirement is met by requiring members to have suffered an injury in fact. 3 The second, the germaneness prong, also examines the constitutional sufficiency of the claim, by requiring an association to have a personal stake in the outcome of the suit. This relationship between the organization's and members' interests assures "concrete adverseness" by limiting the type of interest for which the organization may sue' The third, the individual participation prong, seeks to ensure that the association will be a better representative than individual members would be in pursuing litigation, thus improving judicial efficiency. In International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v Brock, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Hunt three-part test and explained the purpose and policy of associational standing. 7 The Court determined that associational representation provides tremendous advantages both to a court and to an organization's members: "The only practical judicial policy when people pool their capital, their interests, or their activities 47 Brock, 477 US at 290 ("The very forces that cause individuals to band together in an association will thus provide some guarantee that the association will work to promote their interests."). This self-policing mechanism is typically enforced via the authorization procedures. See Part III.B.3. 48 See, for example, notes 66-79 and accompanying text. 
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See note 9.
51 See note 10.
52 See Brock, 477 US at 284-85 (finding that association had standing because "many" members were injured).
53
See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 13 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.9 at 613-14 (West 2d ed 1984) (noting a lack of judicial concern regarding the first prong of the Hunt test-whether individual members can gain standing-in analyzing the cases of organizations with internal conflicts of interest).
A. Lower Courts Differ in Applying the Germaneness Prong to Associations with Internal Conflicts of Interest
The second prong of the Hunt test requires that the organization seek to protect interests that are "germane to the organization's purpose." ' In the ideal associational standing case, the association's litigation objectives would match both the strategy and goals of a single member litigating individually 5 and the stated goals and purpose of the organization's charter or constitution." Thus, when the litigation does not clearly relate to the stated purpose of the organization, such cases would be easily dismissed7 However, it is unclear how closely the litigation and organization's purpose must align.
The Supreme Court has never clarified the limits to which the litigation must be "germane to the organization's purpose."" Consequently, the lower courts disagree as to how central the litigation must be to the organization's purpose in order to grant organizational standing. This Comment will first establish a basic understanding of what is "germane to the organization's purpose," and then explore how lower courts have applied these standards to organizations with internal conflicts of interest.
1.
The germaneness prong requires the subject of litigation to be pertinent to the organization.
Courts agree that the benefits of associational standing described in Brock"? will only be realized if the subject of the litigation is "central to the purpose" of the organization. 6 However, no courts have declared that the litigation itself must be the central purpose. Rather, The typical meaning of "germane" is "relevant or pertinent." ' Most courts have focused on the latter definition and only require a standard of "pertinence" between the litigation's subject matter and the organization's purpose. This standard strikes a balance between providing many of the benefits discussed in Brock and setting a high enough bar to dissuade especially litigious organizations. Courts have found that "[t]oo restrictive a reading of the [germaneness] requirement would undercut the interest of members who join an organization in order to effectuate 'an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others."'"" Consequently, the pertinence standard allows a court to set a baseline to prevent organizations from litigating and thereby "forcing the federal courts to resolve numerous issues as to which the organizations enjoy little expertise and about which few of their members demonstrably care." '4 2. Lower courts are divided over the application of the germaneness prong. The Hodel court also recognized that too loose a reading would allow an organization with an incredibly diverse membership to challenge nearly any law and thus transform the organization into a "law firm seeking to sue in its own name." 840 F2d at 57-58. For further discussion of the "roving law firm" concept, see note 119.
65 Hodel, 840 F2d at 57.
standing. ' Because federal courts have limited power to hear cases, 6 ' courts have found that a lack of strong advocacy will prevent them from hearing cases. An internal conflict of interest may prevent an organization from being a zealous advocate because that organization may not fully pursue litigation when the interests of some of its members will be harmed by the litigation's success."' In Sierra Club v Glickman, 70 the Fifth Circuit articulated the most lenient standard . The court granted the American Farm Bureau Federation standing to intervene on behalf of its members even though not all of its members supported intervention.7 The Fifth Circuit did not even require a majority of members to support the action, but found instead that an organization has "standing to sue if only a few members support it."" Other courts have found that "profound" conflicts of interest among the membership can prevent the litigation from being germane to the organization's purpose. In two cases entitled Retired Chicago Police Association v City of Chicago ("RCPA P" 7 4 and "RCPA IT"'), the Seventh Circuit identified two types of situations in which the conflicts are so "profound" that they would automatically violate the sec- [T] he fact that the litigation, if successful, would harm some members' interests raises a concern that the association will not be fully committed to the litigation and, as a result, will not pursue the litigation with the zealous advocacy necessary to be an adequate representative."). F3d at 864-65 (noting that finding a direct, detrimental effect may mean that the litigation will not be germane to the association's purposes of helping its members, and that "the association will not be fully committed to the litigation and, as a result, will not pursue the litigation with the zealous advocacy necessary to be an adequate representative"). The Seventh Circuit identified a potential third conflict-suing the management of the association. However, this situation essentially is covered by the first scenario, in which an association sues one of its own members. Organizations seeking associational standing must also fulfill Hunt's third prong: "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit."8 The Supreme Court has found that the individual participation prong affects prudential rather than constitutional standing.6 However, courts have found that some internal conflicts of interest may reduce judicial efficiency because the organization cannot effectively assert a dissenting member's interests.s This section will first establish a basic understanding of types of claims typically denied under the individual participation prong. Then it will explore how the lower courts have applied these standards to organizations with internal conflicts.
1. Courts deny associational standing when individualized proof is required.
Courts must examine both the "claim asserted" and the "relief requested" when applying the third prong of the Hunt test.n In general, courts have denied associational standing in litigation that re- he doctrine of associational standing recognizes that the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others."); Patterson, 357 US at 459 ("The Association ... is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views."). 87 See, for example, National Association of College Bookstore Inc v Cambridge University Press, 990 F Supp 245,248-52 (S D NY 1997) (granting standing to the association although the suit would not be optimally efficient because of internal opposition). 88 Hunt, 432 US at 343 (phrasing the third prong of the test as, "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit").
[69:351 quires individual participation.9 Courts have typically denied associational standing when the remedy requested includes damages because individual participation is necessary in identifying the appropriate levels of individual damages.9 When an association requests damages, the damage claims are typically not shared by all members, and thus require individualized participation. ' In this situation, the advantages of associational standing are minimized: the organization is not the best representative of any member's individual interest because the organization is seeking to maximize the membership's total gain, perhaps necessitating sacrifices from individual members.
The Supreme Court has also uniformly denied standing to organizations when elements of the claim require the individual participation of members. For example, in religious expression cases, individuals normally must participate to show the coercive effect of a government action.2 In these types of claims, the advantages of judicial efficiency created by associational standing" are reduced because individual members would be forced to participate individually to prove the elements of a claim. In contrast, two circuits held that an internal conflict of interest should prohibit associational standing because affected dissenting members will intervene to protect their individual interests.6
Courts granting associational standing have relied on numerous rationales drawn from the Hunt analysis. The Ninth Circuit upheld an associational standing claim under the individual participation prong because the Supreme Court never inquired into whether the apple growers and dealers represented by the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission in Hunt unanimously agreed to the suit. Other courts have found that when a majority of the membership supports the litigation and the organization has followed its internal procedures, the internal conflict of interest does not prohibit associational standing, even if a minority of members may be adversely affected. members over others because it had followed its own internal authorization procedures, thus ensuring the adequacy of representation." Courts denying associational standing under the individual participation prong have found that some internal conflicts of interest are so large that affected dissenting members will intervene to protect their rights.° Other circuits have found that even appropriate authorization is insufficient to overcome concerns regarding the individual participation prong. '°' Consequently, the circuit courts' analyses apparently rely on numerous different rationales.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Part II examined the apparent discord among the lower federal courts concerning the effect of an internal conflict of interest on an organization seeking associational standing. Part III will show that the seeming disorder can be easily understood by examining how courts have handled organizations with different intensities of internal conflicts of interest and internal authorization problems. Although courts have proposed numerous reasons for accepting or denying associational standing,n an easily identifiable theme can be deduced from examining the totality of the case law: courts have universally granted standing to organizations that have minor internal conflicts, while generally increasing the level of scrutiny under either the germaneness prong or the individual participation prong when examining profound conflicts.
This Part proposes a test to formalize the underlying reasoning that lower courts have applied in examining organizations with internal conflicts of interest. In applying the Hunt test, courts should first determine what type of conflict exists. If the organization has a profound conflict, then the court must provide greater scrutiny both under the germaneness prong and under the individual participation prong. The court must then determine if the germaneness prong's concerns regarding sufficient constitutional adversity have been overcome by adequate authorization. The court must also examine if indi- The fact that the association voted unanimously to bring the lawsuit sheds little or no light on the germaneness of the lawsuit to the organization's purpose. It is for the court, not the members of the association, to determine whether their interests require individual representation. Here, in view of the actual and potential conflicts, they clearly do. [69:351 vidual participation significantly impairs judicial efficiency or if alternative mechanisms exist to preserve the considerable benefits of associational standing.
To provide coherence to the lower courts' decisions, the underlying rationales behind both the germaneness prong... and the individual participation prong"4 must be analyzed and applied to organizations with internal conflicts of interest. Part III.B demonstrates how courts must examine how authorization affects constitutional adversity under the germaneness prong. Part III.C shows that identification of a profound conflict and its authorization can serve as a shorthand test to determine whether judicial efficiency will be impaired under the individual participation prong. Finally, Part III.D endorses alternative measures for courts to handle organizations with profound conflicts besides denying associational standing.
A. Courts Must Assess Whether the Organization Has a Profound Internal Conflict of Interest
In analyzing whether to grant associational standing, courts must first determine if the conflict is minor or profound. With a minor internal conflict of interest, members of the organization may dislike the litigation, but have no vested interest in its outcome. Courts have granted standing to organizations with these types of conflicts ' and should continue to do so. However, many conflicts have impacts on members that are more significant. The Seventh Circuit provides the best categorization of these types of conflicts by defining as profound conflicts those cases in which the organization is suing one of its own members or in which litigation will "cause a direct detriment" to some of the organization's members."6 Organizations with these types of conflicts are sometimes granted and sometimes denied associational standing.n with which the organization pursues the litigation, 2 perhaps even to the point of failing the constitutional threshold of case or controversy. 1' 3 Consequently, a court could find that an organization is not the most effective advocate, and that litigation may be pursued more effectively on an individual level. 116 Only one court has incorrectly reasoned that courts should independently determine whether they have the authority to hear the case. See Associated General Contractors of ND v Otter Tail Power Co, 611 F2d 684,691 (8th Cir 1979) (finding that the unanimous approval of the litigation by members "sheds little or no light on the germaneness of the lawsuit to the organization's purpose"). Most courts disagree with the Eighth Circuit and find that authorization aids in assuring zealous advocacy to meet the constitutional requirement of case or controversy. See, for example, RPCA II, 76 F3d at 865 (explaining that whenever litigation is "authorized in accordance with the association's procedures ... the membership has affirmed that the detriment to some members' interests does not render the litigation outside the germane interests of [the] as-[69:351 falls within the scope of legitimate association action because proper authorization indicates the membership's collective will to support the litigation. With authorization, the membership has affirmed that the detriment to some members' interests does not render the litigation outside the interests of the association."' Such circumstances should assure courts that the association will pursue the litigation with the strong advocacy and persistence necessary to be an effective representative. "8 Consequently, an organization approving the litigation through the proper authorization procedures would fulfill the germaneness prong.' Since most litigation is properly approved, most organizations with internal conflicts of interest would satisfy the gerinaneness prong and would be able to gain standing/'°s ociation, assur[ing] that [it] will pursue the litigation with the strong advocacy and persistence necessary to be an effective representative"). Simply assuring that the litigation was authorized does not solve all possible concerns a court may encounter when applying the Hunt test. ) ("Unanimity among AGC's members is not a requirement for its standing. Resolution of frictions within AGC's membership is a matter of its governance. As long as the suit is not in contravention of its purposes nor its by-laws which govern its decision making process, it has standing."). Some concerns remain about an organization that attempts to become a "roving law firm with standing" for any particular-interest case. This organization could structure itself so that it could easily alter its constitution to meet the pertinence standard for each case it brings without strong support for the litigation from the membership. However, in such circumstances, Hunt's first prong still requires an organization seeking standing to meet the would of course provide a significant check on renegade leaders of litigious associations."). See also note 17. If the organization is large enough to encompass many individuals so that a single member is likely to have an injury for any given litigation (for example, a national political party with tens of millions of members), the organization will likely also have a member who would be on the opposite side of the litigation. Thus, associational standing would be denied under the individual participation prong. Moreover, courts have not expressed serious concern over granting associational standing to organizations created specifically for the purpose of litigation. See, for example, Pennell v City of San Jose, 485 US 1, 7 n 3 (1988) (finding the gerinaneness prong fulfilled because the association claimed to be "'organized for the purpose of representing the interests of the owners and lessors of real property' in San Jose in this lawsuit") (citation omitted).
120 Conflicts should be examined under the individual participation prong. See Part III.C. Some litigation may be properly approved but still fail the mere pertinence standard of the germaneness prong. See note 62.
4. Some conflicts may cause an association to fail the requirement of constitutional adversity even when the litigation is properly authorized.
Proper authorization will not necessarily solve all of the constitutional concerns regarding a court's jurisdiction. In some situations, those who control the approval and direction of the litigation may have an individual stake in the litigation (besides their representative capacity) that could directly conflict with the interests of the rest of the membership. 121 In these types of situations, even if the litigation has been appropriately approved, the court should deny standing because of the potential for inadequate representation. However, these situations occur quite infrequently and only when the authorization and representation functions are merged."
Proper authorization provides numerous benefits in ensuring that an association meets the constitutional requirements for standing. Because profound conflicts can undermine the adversity required to meet the Article III case-or-controversy requirement, proper authorization can ensure that the organization as a whole supports the litigation and thus will zealously pursue the litigation. However, a few organizations, ones whose representative and authorization functions are merged, will be incapable of zealously advocating for minority interests, and thus should be barred from gaining associational standing.
C. Conflicts of Interest Should Be Examined under the Individual Participation Prong
The proposed test also requires heightened scrutiny under the individual participation prong whenever a profound conflict exists. Internal conflicts of interest may require individuals to intervene to protect their interests, thus violating the third prong of the Hunt test.n This Comment proposes adopting the profound conflicts test124 as an initial screening device to identify situations in which dissenting members are likely to intervene to protect their rights: when the organiza- turned these individuals are effectively denied any potential recourse. Theoretically, individual members could attempt to pressure the legislature to enact similar benefits. However, the likelihood of success of such an effort is effectively zero. Members who currently benefit from the statute consequently must present their legal arguments during the litigation through intervention or lose any chance of preserving their benefits.
In other direct detriment cases, successful litigation will not automatically deny any form of relief to dissenting members, but instead will force such members to litigate on their own behalf. M However, these dissenting members will face additional burdens resulting from the association's actions: 1) some courts may find that the dissenting member and the organization share such a unity of facts and interest that the litigant would be precluded from a collateral attack upon the judgment; m or 2) individuals may be hampered by the stare decisis effect of the litigation." Thus, many direct-detriment conflicts would seem to result in a denial of associational standing because heightened scrutiny under the individual participation prong will show that individual members must participate in order for their interests to be adequately represented. However, courts can and should find alternate methods to preserve dissenting members' interests while still granting standing to the organization. ' The other profound conflict-the "suing one's own" conflict talso automatically requires individual participation. A member who is sued is a necessary party to the litigationn and must participate in orued enforcement of the statute while others would benefit if the law were declared unconstitutional). 134 Courts will apply the doctrine of res judicata and preclude a subsequent claim when: (1) the first judgment was final and on the merits; (2) the prior action involved the same parties or their privies; and (3) the prior action involved essentially the same claim. James Win. Moore, 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 131.01 at 131-11 to 131-12 (Matthew Bender 3d ed 2001).
135 A court will not automatically preclude a dissenting member from relitigating because there may not be a unity of facts and interests. However, the stare decisis effect will likely insulate the defendant from future collateral attacks. Although a previous ruling will not bind a dissenting member, the precedential effect provides an additional hurdle for an individual member seeking to validate a claim. der to protect her own rights and respond to any claims brought against her. Consequently, courts should deny associational standing to any organization that is suing one of its own members.' 39 Minor conflicts outside these two categories will not be a bar under this proposed solution. Because only profound conflicts receive heightened scrutiny, organizations with conflicts that do not reach that level will be granted associational standing. Regardless of the judicial theory supposedly relied upon, courts have consistently granted associational standing for organizations that have minor conflicts falling outside the two types of profound conflicts.' ° Minor conflicts should not prevent associational standing because granting such power to "remote interests of discrete members would seriously undermine the ability of individuals through organizations to achieve public interest objectives through the legal system.' 4 ' 2. Courts should examine the litigation's authorization process in order to aid judicial efficiency.
The proposed solution recognizes that an organization cannot be a single monolithic entity with complete unanimity of interests. All associations will have some conflicts,' 4 2 especially since most are formed around broad purposes.' 43 As a result, "because internal conflicts are endemic to associations, members expect to incur certain costs to their own interests upon joining.'"4 Members are willing to sacrifice a por-tion of their individual interests to achieve a greater common objective. Consequently, this Comment recommends taking advantage of the self-policing mechanism identified in Brock that helps to assure that organizations only pursue actions favorable to the entire organization." This process, exemplified by appropriate authorization,' ' ensures that the organization has evaluated the litigation and determined that pursuing the litigation will further the organization's goals, even if individual members will be injured."
Courts should grant standing to an organization only when the organization has properly approved the litigation. Otherwise, individuals would be unable to "create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others."' All of the interested members would be forced to litigate the problem individually, requiring the courts to hear multiple cases and thus drastically reducing judicial efficiency. ' Given the Supreme Court's espoused preference for associational standing and its importance as a mechanism for litigating individual members' claims,IS courts should not lightly deny associational standing even when there is a profound conflict that requires individual participation.
tion's own procedures had been violated. It is not obvious to us that this rationale should not apply to an association's internal resolution of conflicts about litigating positions.
Id.
145 See Brock, 477 US at 290 ("The very forces that cause individuals to band together in an association will thus provide some guarantee that the association will work to promote their interests."). The third "special feature" of associations cited in [Brock] , their self-policing character, would seem to carry particular force on the germaneness issue. If the "forces that cause individuals to band together" guarantee some degree of fair representation, they surely guarantee as well that associational policymakers will not run roughshod over the strongly held views of association members in fashioning litigation goals.
Obviously some concern exists regarding influential minorities commandeering the approval process. However, these concerns can be allayed via traditional organizational remedies, such as actions for breach of fiduciary duty or violation of an organization's charter. See text accompanying note 158. ing representational standing to an organization with an internal conflict of interest "would clearly be inimical to the goals of judicial efficiency: It is precisely in cases where large organizations are present that the greatest benefits are to be reaped by collective adjudication.").
150 See Brock, 477 US at 288-90 (discussing the strengths of associational standing and its importance for the just adjudication of claims). See also text accompanying notes 38-47.
D. Courts Should Preserve Dissenting Members' Rights through Less Drastic Measures than Denial of Standing
The proposed test requires heightened scrutiny to determine when profound conflicts diminish constitutional adversity or reduce judicial efficiency under Hunt's second and third prongs, but it also requires courts to dismiss standing claims only in extreme circumstances. In light of the tremendous benefits derived from associational standing,'' courts should explore whatever means possible to allow associational standing. '2 However, in some situations, a court may find that the unique combination of circumstances makes alternative mechanisms unworkable and that a party is "indispensable" to the litigation." 3 The court should deny associational standing to the organization in such a case because the dissenting member is "required" to participate in the litigation, thus violating Hunt's third prong."" Eventually, the suit could be filed again, but interested individuals who bring the suit would lack the expertise and resources of the original organization."
Before dismissal, courts should examine any alternative mechanisms of preserving dissenting members' rights. The proposed test incorporates the methods by which numerous courts have taken into account dissenters' interests:
3) by allowing subsequent actions seeking compensation for misbehavior of the organization.n Each of these remedies would allow individual dissenting members to protect their interests but would not require the dismissal of what the Supreme Court has described as "the special features [of associational standing], advantageous both to the individuals represented and to the judicial system as a whole."" ' 9
CONCLUSION
Associational standing enhances judicial efficiency and helps secure the just administration of members' rights. However, the internal conflicts of an organization initially appear to violate several prongs of the Supreme Court's test to ensure constitutional standing and effective representation. The confusing lower court analyses can be clarified by a multi-part test examining the authorization process of profound conflicts to determine if sufficient constitutional adversity exists. A court should only dismiss based on a lack of associational standing when a conflict is so profound that it requires dissenting members to intervene to protect their rights-either because they are being sued or because the litigation will cause a direct detriment to their interests. Even then, courts will best fulfill the Court's desired efficient advocacy by seeking to preserve the rights of dissenting members through other avenues. In summary, courts must consider the tremendous benefits of associational standing and seek alternative mechanisms to preserve this valuable tool for both an organization's members and the courts.
